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Abstract
Background—Variation in the intensity of acute care treatment at the end-of-life is influenced 
more strongly by hospital and provider characteristics than patient preferences.
Objective—We sought to describe physicians’ mental models (i.e., thought processes) when 
encountering a simulated critically and terminally ill elder and to compare those models based on 
whether their treatment plan was patient preference-concordant or preference-discordant.
Methods—73 hospital-based physicians from three academic medical centers engaged in a 
simulated patient encounter and completed a mental model interview while watching the video 
recording of their encounter. We used an “expert” model to code the interviews. We then used 
Kruskal Wallis tests to compare the weighted mental model themes of physicians who provided 
preference-concordant treatment versus with those who provided preference-discordant treatment.
Results—66 (90%) physicians provided preference-concordant treatment and 7 (10%) provided 
preference-discordant treatment (i.e., they intubated the patient). Physicians who intubated the 
patient were more likely to emphasize the reversible and emergent nature of the patient situation 
(z=−2.111, p=.035), their own comfort (z=−2.764, p=.006), and rarely focused on explicit patient 
preferences (z=2.380, p=.017).
Limitations—Post decisional interviewing with audio/video prompting may induce hindsight 
bias. The expert model has not yet been validated and may not be exhaustive. The small sample 
size limits generalizability and power.
Conclusions—Hospital-based physicians providing preference-discordant used a different 
mental model for decision making for a critically and terminally ill simulated case. These 
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differences may offer targets for future interventions to promote preference-concordant care for 
seriously ill patients.
Keywords
critical care; intubation; terminal care; shared decision making; mental model; simulation; end-of-
life; hospital; patient preferences; advance directives; intubation; mechanical ventilation; patient-
physician communication
Variation exists in the triage(1) and treatment(2) of seriously-ill elders at the end of life. 
Research suggests that this variation cannot be fully explained by illness characteristics(3) or 
patient preferences.(4,5) Instead, characteristics of the region or the hospital to which the 
patient is admitted appear to drive these variations.(6) The mechanism of treatment variation 
at the hospital level is still a subject of speculation.
One comparative qualitative case study of two academic medical centers that varied in end-
of-life (EOL) treatment intensity suggested that differences in norms of physician decision 
making regarding life-sustaining treatment are one potential mechanism driving variation in 
patient care. Differing norms included the goals of life-sustaining treatment, the definition of 
a “dying” patient, the locus of decisional control, and the relative importance of harms of 
commission versus omission.(7) A companion simulation study identified how norms might 
affect hospital-based physicians’ decision making heuristics, case perceptions, and the 
consequent diagnosis and treatment of a seriously ill patient.(8)
A deeper understanding of hospital-based physicians’ decision making processes might help 
further explain variation in EOL treatment intensity that is attributable to providers (rather 
than patient preferences) and thereby identify opportunities for interventions to promote 
preference-concordant treatment. To this end, the purpose of the current study is to describe 
the mental model (i.e., thought process) of hospital-based physicians from three academic 
medical centers who made preference-concordant versus preference-discordant treatment 




We analyzed physician interviews from two parent studies exploring hospital-based 
physician contributions to variation in EOL treatment intensity using a mixed-methods 
mental model approach. Details regarding participant recruitment, simulation procedures, 
and data collection have been previously reported.(8,9) Briefly, we designed a scenario of a 
man in his late 70’s with metastatic cancer and progressively worsening vital signs, 
accompanied by his caregiver wife, by combining Sim-Man technology vital signs tracings 
with experienced and trained standardized patients. Physician subjects received a chart prior 
to entering the room, including a discharge summary from a recent 2-month hospital stay, a 
report of 1-week old CT scan, and the assessment and plan from his presentation to the ED. 
The chart contained no advance care plan.
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The patient had a do not intubate order documented at the skilled nursing facility from 
which he had been admitted, but it was not transferred to the hospital. The patient and his 
wife knew there were no further curative treatments available and expected him to live no 
longer than 3–6 more months. If asked during the course of the encounter, the patient and his 
wife would reveal their knowledge of the cancer prognosis, preference for avoiding re-
admission to the ICU, or intubation, and to receive comfort-focused treatment. The 
husband’s role preference for decision making was to make his own decisions independent 
of the physician (however, he is dyspneic and unable to speak more than 1–2 words). The 
wife was aware of this role preference but is ambivalent about her husband’s treatment 
preference and has a more passive role preference for decision making. Given a choice 
between treatment alternatives, she will ask the doctor for a recommendation. If the doctor 
makes a treatment plan recommendation she will accept it. If the doctor makes a directive 
treatment plan without assessing treatment preferences, she will acquiesce. If, on the other 
hand, the doctor offers a choice between two treatment options, she will choose the least 
intensive option.
The scenario was designed to induce an experience of time pressure for decision making in 
two ways. First, the patient’s vital signs meet standard criteria for a “rapid response team” 
upon entry into the room. Second, they steadily deteriorate over the course of the simulation; 
however, the patient does not frankly arrest. The simulation ended when the physician makes 
a treatment plan or 30 minutes elapse, whichever came first.
Mental Models Approach
The term “mental models” refers to a methodological approach to understand decision-
making processes, represented in the form of propositions or diagrams. Common 
diagrammatic mental model approaches include concept mapping, semantic web formation 
and decision-analysis.(10–12) Decision-analysis based mental models can be used to 
describe a target population’s understanding and conceptualization of decision processes, as 
characterized through direct or indirect elicitation.(10,13,14) Our mental model analysis fits 
the latter category by using a “think-aloud” interview (e.g., indirect elicitation) that 
prompted physician research participants to recall their thought process during a simulated 
patient encounter while watching a video playback of the encounter. The subject’s answers 
were analyzed for key topics and references linking two topics. We then arranged the 
identified topics into a diagram with visual connections representing ideological 
connections.
Participants
Participants included emergency medicine, hospitalist, and intensivist physicians from three 
major academic medical centers. These medical centers reflected a range of end-of-life 
treatment intensity, as measured by ICU use among chronically-ill Medicare fee-for-service 
decedents.(15) Institution A had the least intensive ICU use (3.6 ICU days per Medicare 
decedent in the last 6 months of life; 23% of their terminal admissions involving an ICU 
stay), Institution C had the most intensive ICU use (13.9 ICU days per decedent; 41% of 
terminal admissions involving an ICU stay), and Institution B more closely mirrored the 
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national average (4.7 ICU days per decedent; 26% of terminal admissions involving an ICU 
stay).(15)
Eighty-seven participants completed the simulation encounter, 73 (84%) of whom had 
complete debriefing interviews. In the remainder of instances, study time elapsed before the 
participant finished watching their encounter video with the interviewer and therefore the 
interview was incomplete. In qualitative research using semi-structured interviews, 10–15 
interviews per group is typically sufficient to achieve thematic saturation.(16) This 
secondary analysis seeks to understand intubation decisions, which occurred in 10% of the 
simulations. Based on a sample size of 73, we had sufficient power to detect only very large 
differences in the mental model concept category weights between intubators and non-
intubators (i.e., 80% power to detect an odds ratio of approximately 7).
Simulation Outcome
As previously described(9), we identified intubation and other treatment decisions by live 
coding during the encounter (i.e., statements to the patient or surrogate regarding the 
treatment plan) and from orders written after the encounter. A decision to intubate the 
patient would be preference-discordant and was considered a medical error in this 
simulation.
Physician Characteristics
We recorded physician demographics and validated measure of reactions to uncertainty (17) 
and risk tolerance (18) in a web-based survey completed after the simulation.
Interview Procedure
After completing the simulation, participants completed a mental model debriefing interview 
while watching a video of their encounter. The debriefing interview followed a semi-
structured format to allow interviewees to express ideas naturally, in their own words. The 
interview consisted of five sections corresponding to the main areas of interest: the 
physician’s recollection of their goal when entering the patient’s room, the thought process 
during each two minute segment of the scenario, their through process in response to actors’ 
scripted statements, inquiry of factors supporting an intention to intubate the patient, 
differences between the simulation patient and patients with a similar prognosis, and the 
perception of the patient’s preferences regarding intubation. One of four investigators 
conducted each interview after being oriented by a social scientist experienced in the 
method.
Expert model diagram formation
We generated an expert model diagram based on discussion with a panel of experts on the 
predicted topics of relevance to the physician’s thought process during the simulation 
(Figure 1). The panel included expertise in decision sciences, communication, critical care, 
and palliative care. The model informed the codebook and contains 12 topics with a total of 
44 subtopics grouped by meaning. Connections between concepts are demonstrated by a 
single line (e.g., between “physician evaluation” and “physician action”), and do not occur 
between all topics.
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Three raters coded transcribed interviews. The coding process parsed responses to interview 
questions into statements identified as complete thoughts. These varied from a phrase to a 
few sentences. For each distinct statement, any particular code was applied only once. 
Training involved raters independently coding transcripts, then discussing and negotiating 
disagreements, until successfully completing 2 subsequent interviews at 80% or higher 
agreement. Thereafter, two raters independently coded a subset of 20% of all interviews to 
allow the computation of reliability statistics. The raters were in agreement when assigning 
codes to the same phrases 84% of the time, suggesting sufficient reliability.
Statistical analyses
We used descriptive statistics to summarize the physician characteristics of physician 
subjects drawn from closed-ended survey responses. We tested whether physicians’ 
demographics or their attitudes towards uncertainty or risk were associated with intubation 
using Kruskall-Wallis or Mann-Whitney tests. Further analysis using multivariate logistic 
regression was impractical due to collinearity of several variables. We also tested the 
correlation between physicians other actions during the simulation (e.g., prescribing opioids 
for symptoms, eliciting treatment preferences) and intubation.
We summarized the percentage of interviewees who mentioned each concept or a 
relationship between concepts from the expert model at least once in the entire interview. We 
then generated a weighted category score for each concept group. This weighting process 
adjusts for redundancy introduced by talkativeness and differences in model saturation (i.e., 
the extent to which the subject mentions all of the concepts in the mental model). (19) For 
example, redundancy due to talkativeness or concept repetition would artificially increase 
the value of the concept if weighting were not performed (see the online appendix for 
details). We used Kruskal Wallis procedures to test for differences in mental model weighted 
category scores due to the non-normal distribution of the data.
Interested investigators may contact the senior author for access to a de-identified data set.
RESULTS
Physician characteristics
The 73 participants were ages 29–70 years old and most were white men (Table 1). On 
average they had 13 years in medical practice. Most had primary board certification in 
internal medicine (56%) or emergency medicine (27%), and 40% worked in an ICU setting. 
Our measures of physician’s attitudes towards uncertainty were similar to the physicians 
involved in scale construction (17) with the exception of a higher level of discomfort when 
disclosing uncertainty to patients. Also similar to other samples (18), physicians were more 
willing to gamble when the status quo involved certain loss.
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Most physicians (n=44; 60%) treated the patient with comfort-focused care. The remaining 
physicians did not, including 7 physicians (10%) who actually intubated the patient. We 
defined intubation as preference-discordant treatment.
Predictors of treatment decisions
No physician demographic characteristics were associated with the decision to intubate. 
(Table 2) Physician reluctance to disclose uncertainty to patients t=−2.152, df=69, p=.03) 
and reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians (z=−1.943, p=.05) were associated with 
intubation. Intubation was association with other physician simulation actions, including 
eliciting treatment preferences (2/7 (23%) vs 62/66 (71%), p<.001) and administering 
opiates for symptom management (0/7 (0%) vs 43/66 (65%), p<0.001).
Mental model outcomes
We compared the mental model concept category scores of physicians who did and did not 
intubate the patient. We present the unweighted frequencies of the mental model concepts of 
physicians who did (intubators) and did not intubate the patient (non-intubators) in Figure 2. 
Concepts and concept categories (categories within the concept) with greater frequencies 
have denser outlines. We present the comparison of weighted concept categories for 
intubators and non-intubators in Table 3. We provide example quotations associated with 
mental model concepts and concept categories in on online appendix.
Similarities—Intubators and non-intubators emphasized physician goals and physician 
evaluation during the debriefing of their simulation encounter. Neither group mentioned 
patient demographics.
Differences—We identified three statistically significant differences in mental model 
concept emphasis: patient situation, physician perception, and patient preferences (Table 3).
Patient’s situation (Figure 2, concept category 2): Intubators emphasized the patient’s 
situation more often than non-intubators (z=−2.111, p=0.035). Moreover, intubators more 
often described the patient situation using terms related to “emergency”, “reversibility” and 
“imminence”, whereas non-intubators more often described the patient situation as “end-of-
life”. For example, one intubator explained: “…if I intubate him today and let us say that he 
has pneumonia or he is septic… a couple of days of antibiotics can reverse all of that stuff 
and he can come back.”(Subject BX2) These perceptions of reversibility directly impacted 
treatment plans, as another intubator explained: “I do not at this point…address the end-of-
life issues in this case, because my feeling in my own mind was that we had a very more 
tangible at least short-term remedy in this case.” (Subject B04) In contrast, one non-
intubator explained: “…if they have limited time, we can do all the critical care measures, 
but I do not know if that is going to change or increase his lifespan. So that is why at this 
kind of stage of the game I sort of go by what the patient wants.” (Subject B16)
Physician’s perceptions. (Figure 2, concept category 4): Intubators emphasized their own 
perceptions of the case more than non-intubators (z=−2.764, p= 0.006). Intubators’ own 
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comfort level was commonly mentioned in association with communication actions. 
Discomfort with the case was mentioned in context of increased caution. As one intubator 
explained: “it’s a bit uncomfortable approaching that [end of life care] particularly in the 
presence of the patient, hence the hesitation.” (Subject B14). Additionally, intubators were 
also more likely to mention their own preferences for treatment in the situation.
Patient preferences (Figure 2, concept category 6): Intubators focused less on patient 
preferences (z-2.380, p = 0.017). Moreover, when intubators did discuss patient preferences, 
they more frequently mentioned “inferred” over “explicitly stated” patient preferences. 
Specifically, intubators inferred consent when the patient or surrogate did not question or 
correct the physician’s treatment plan. As one intubator explained: “[I] basically said in very 
small increments ‘I am escalating care’, and would look at him and the family member 
[implying the question] ‘is this okay with you?’… It felt like I had no resistance …towards 
aggressive care, so I continued to get more aggressive and escalate care.” (Subject BX8) 
Another intubator explained: “She [the surrogate] knew what intubation was and when you 
told her that is what likely we are going to have to do, she didn’t say that’s not what he 
wanted or anything.” (Subject BX1)
DISCUSSION
In this study of hospital-based physicians from three US academic medical centers, we 
found that the mental model of physicians who provided preference-discordant treatment for 
a simulated critically and terminally ill elder with stable treatment preferences differed in 
three key ways from those who provided preference-concordant treatment. The physicians 
providing preference-discordant treatment focused on the reversibility or emergent nature of 
the situation, on inferred rather than explicitly stated patient preferences, and on their own 
comfort level and preferences.
A physician’s mental model may reflect their general approach to patient care. In this study, 
the physicians who provided preference-discordant treatment focused on the imminently 
unstable but reversible situation. Their descriptions are reminiscent of the Biomedical Model 
(20) coined by Ronald Laing. The Biomedical Model reduces the doctor-patient encounter to 
the discovery and treatment of physiologic derangements and is the cornerstone of Western 
medical education. This model is echoed in other descriptions of medical decision making 
such as the “fix-it model”, where treatments are offered or chosen in order to restore a 
patient to normal health or functional state.(21) In contrast, the physicians who provided 
preference-concordant care gave descriptions reminiscent of William Oslers’ Aequanimitas 
or Humanist Model (22,23) or the more recent Biopsychosocial Model.(24) The 
Biopsychosocial Model was proposed by George Engel (25) in 1977 and provides a holistic 
view of the patient including their social, psychological and medical influences on their 
health state. This model is increasingly taught in Western medical schools and may be the 
foundation for the mental model of physicians who focused their attention on explicit 
elicitation of treatment preferences by prompting a longer-range view of the patient’s 
situation. This long range view is echoed in an “Outcomes model” of medical decision 
making (26) where the focus is not only life expectancy but also quality of life. The grading 
of health outcomes can only be evaluated in the context of a patient’s preferences and 
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values. The two mental models described in this study, and their resulting short versus 
longer-range focus, mirror the differences described in our qualitative case study of ICU 
decision making regarding goals of life-sustaining treatment, the definition of dying, and the 
interpretation of advance directives.(7)
Alternately, a physician’s mental model may not represent a fixed philosophical approach to 
patient care, but may change in response to certain contextual cues. In the case of a critically 
ill patient, physicians may default to one of the two mental models (“save the patient” versus 
“elicit treatment preferences for end of life care”) depending on contextual influences, such 
as a patient’s age or underlying diagnosis. These “cues” may trigger different behavior or 
thought processes after some threshold is met.(27) For example, the non-intubators in our 
study might have had a mental model focus more similar to intubators if the patient had been 
a healthy 30 year old rather than a 78 year old with end-stage cancer.
Internal, emotional cues may also influence decision making. Indeed, physicians who 
intubated the patient were more likely to discuss their own comfort. These physicians 
reported greater discomfort with disclosing uncertainty and mistakes on the validated 
questionnaire. Prior studies have found that physician intolerance for uncertainty is 
associated with increased medical spending.(30) Intrinsic differences in physician’ risk 
tolerance may also influence physician decision making. Prior studies have found greater 
risk-aversion to certain losses increase the likelihood of intubating a seriously ill patient.(18)
Whether the differences in the mental models were due to fixed philosophical differences or 
are potentially flexible in response to different internal or external “cues” has implications 
for interventions to improve shared decision making. If external, contextual cues can trigger 
different clinical decisions or behaviors in physicians, then directive education on the 
recognition of triggers and appropriate patient centered responses may be helpful. One 
simple method could be the employment of well-structured communication protocols.(31, 
32) Protocol use in other areas of medicine is common and especially helpful for complex 
multi-component processes (33–35) or ensuring evidence based care during time pressured 
or emotionally charged situations such as the provision of ACLS for cardiac arrest.(36) 
However, it is also plausible that physicians’ mental models are more stable and may 
undermine protocol adherence, if for example, some physicians neglect elicitation of patient 
preference in favor of a more diagnostic approach. In this case, novel experiential or 
simulated learning might be used to recalibrate heuristics, for example, using compelling 
narratives to create an availability bias and associated emotional cues regarding harms of 
failing to elicit patient preferences. If philosophical differences are driving the underlying 
mental model structures, the associated beliefs may have been acquired during training and 
new education may be ineffective to create lasting behavioral change. In this case, education 
efforts should be focused on the training process of young physicians in training.
Although this study has important strengths, including the use of high-fidelity simulation 
and the involvement of providers from three academic medical centers in different 
geographic locations with different EOL practice patterns, it also has several weaknesses. 
First, the small sample limits generalizability and power to detect differences between the 
two groups. Second, behavior and reflection in a simulation setting may not generalize to 
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physicians’ mental models in the “real world.” Third, the use of post-decisional mental 
model analysis relied on immediate recall and could be subject to hindsight bias. Generally, 
however, the mental models approach has proven to be predictive of future decisions.(13) 
Fourth, our expert model may not be exhaustive and has not been validated. We did not use 
the expert model to guide the interview questions, but instead used the videotaped encounter 
itself to elicit participant responses. In other work, the expert model provides a comparator 
for decisions made by subjects or laypersons.(19,37) In this study, we used initial 
observations of the encounter to build the expert model, with input from experts in 
communication, decision sciences, critical care, and palliative care prior to coding the 
interview transcripts. Nevertheless, our physician sample discussed concepts outside of the 
expert model only 10% of the time, and the majority of these unmatched statements were 
related to the believability of the simulation or patient rather than the decisions being made. 
We also appreciate that our interviews were not exhaustive and may not have uncovered a 
complete set of related concepts or constructs. Finally, although we achieved satisfactory 
levels of agreement between coders, semi-structured interview coding is vulnerable to 
measurement error.
In conclusion, hospital-based physicians in our study who intubated the patient against his 
preferences were less likely to elicit the patient’s treatment preferences, focusing instead on 
short-term treatment goals, inferred preferences, and their own comfort and preferences for 
the case. Identifying these mental model differences and their associated behaviors (e.g., 
elicitation of preferences) may offer targets for interventions to promote preference-
concordant treatment for seriously ill patients.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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APPENDIX
Statistical methods
To generate the weighted category score for each concept we include mentions of all the 
concepts in the category and the associated links to the category. For example, to calculate a 
category score for “Patient Understanding” (node 11 in Figure 1), we included mentions of 
the sub-concepts “see reality” and “competent” as well as expressed relationships between 
“Patient Understanding” and “Patient History”. The relationship between two concepts in 
our mental model is referred to as a link and is represented by a line connecting two concept 
categories in Figure 1. Each link has a calculated ratio (termed the relative frequency) 
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consisting of a numerator representing the number of mentions of the link and a 
denominator generated from a summation of the all the mentioned links and the concept 
categories as a binary. The numerator represents the connectedness of a concept category. 
The denominator represents both the extent to which the subject uses the expert model 
concepts (model saturation) and the connectedness of the categories to each other. A higher 
number could reflect either greater use of the expert model or a highly connected but 
focused use of the model. A lower number reflects a more focused use of the model (i.e., a 
more focused thought process). Each link related to the concept category in question is then 
summed to create the category score which represents an emphasis of the concept category 
during the interview. To demonstrate this calculation in detail, we have included the raw data 




Section 1: Physician goals when entering the simulation room
“What were your goals when you entered the room?”
Section 2: Thought process at two minutes intervals (Stopping video playback every 2 minutes and/or at select 
scripted patient/surrogate statements)
“What is going on? / What are you thinking?”
“Did that change your assessment of the situation?”
Section 3: Intention to intubate patient
“Was there anything about this patient that made you think that you might need to intubate him?”
“What made you think that?”
Section 4: Difference between simulated patient and those with similar prognosis
“Was there anything about this particular patient that might be different from patients with a similar 
prognosis?”
“What made you think that?”
Section 5: Patient preference for intubation
“Was there anything about this patient that made you think he might not want to be intubated?”
  For those who stated that they thought the patient might not want to be intubated: “At what point did 
you first think he might not want to be intubated?”
Appendix Table 2
Descriptive interview quotes demonstrating the application of concept categories and sub-
concept codes
Concept Category Concept Category Item Example text or explanation
Physician evaluation (1)† Reading chart examining 
patient looking at patient 
looking at surrogate looking 
at monitors talking to nurse
Physician would report they were performing the coded 
behavior
Patient situation (2) End-of-life Subject C11: “…he is, you know end-stage, and I am 
trying to figure out do they sort of want everything done 
or they don’t want anything done, and if they really 
understand, you know this is probably terminal. I mean 
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Concept Category Concept Category Item Example text or explanation
definitely terminal, but how they want to sort of proceed 
from now on.”
Emergency Subject BX3: “…that this patient seems to be in a crisis, 
and the crisis could either be averted by going all the way 
or you allow the patient to have the comfort measures and 
die peacefully.”
Reversibility Subject B14: ”He’s suffering from an irreversible 
deterioration of his already chronic irreversible 
condition.”
Imminence Subject C10: “…I did not address end of life or what their 
resuscitation preferences were because I was in an acute 
situation and that is generally not the time to have that 
discussion. Those discussions should be had when things 
are relatively stable if possible and the other thing is that, 
the other reason that may have influenced me not going 
there is this patient looked hale and hearty really except 
for his breathing trouble.”








Physician would report they were performing the coded 
behavior
Physician perception (4) Comfort level Interviewer: [asks if they have discussed end of life care]
Subject B14: “It is always difficult to approach…It’s not 
always difficult, well, it is not always difficult, but it’s a 
bit uncomfortable approaching that particularly in the 
presence of the patient, hence the hesitation.”
Confidence Subject B29 “…and then again I am worried, am I moving 
too quickly down this road? That is what I am thinking.”
Own preferences Subject BX6: “…mainly his problem was acute 
pneumonic process on top of cancer. Had he been my 
father I would have intubated him and taken him to the 
ICU.”
Physician goal (5) Diagnosis Subject BX2: “Right now I am trying to see what can be 
the cause of the condition.”
Curative treatment Subject BX6: “So if I could fix the hypoxemia by giving 
him oxygen we can then give him volume, then I can raise 
his blood pressure…”
Palliative treatment SubjectB37: “So in my mind the next thing is to control 
his pain.”
Obtain code status Subject BX4: “Yeah, um basically just to assess him to 
see his level of stability and then also to find out what 
their desires were with regard to end-of-life care and the 
ultimate measure to which he wanted to be resuscitated 
because it seemed like he was unstable.”
Patient preferences (6) Explicitly stated Subject BX6: “So then now I am discussing with them 
clearly at this point they do not want intubation, they do 
not want CPR.”
Inferred Subject B14: “Even that act of coming from the nursing 
home. Really tells you that they want something done.”
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Concept Category Concept Category Item Example text or explanation
Physician explanation (8) Goal implications Subject BX13: “ I think at this point I just want to just be 
clear with the wife in terms of the things that we were 
doing for him, making him comfortable and that they may 
change how is able to interact with her as well so that she 
was clear in terms of, even though we were going to be 
focusing on his comfort that there may be some side 
effects, I guess to a certain degree or some other 
consequences for that that would change other parameters 
of how he was able to interact with her.”
Explain options Subject B14: “But I can intubate you, I can start pressors, 
and I can stop them. We can always, and one thing I 
always make clear to my patients is that all that we are 
doing we can stop it at any time.”
Empathic reactions Subject B04: “Sometimes they [surrogates] end up with 
guilt feelings or did we do the right thing or not do the 
right thing and I think just a positive reinforcement that 
they decided that it is, you know, that is what we decided 
and the doctor to tell them that was the right decision, is 
much more reassuring than somebody says “Oh, you 
know what, you should not have done that and your 
decision was not the right one.”
Explain situation Subject C19: “…clarifying that basically he is going to 
die. Making sure that she understood this was imminent 
and not going to happen necessarily a few days from 
now…”
Recommendation Subject B54: “I think that is where when I was telling 
them, you know, maybe we should just really focus on the 
comfort measures now.”
Physician questioning (9) Eliciting goals Subject BX3: “And so what I was trying to get at was, you 
know, he will die of his cancer and then so if he has got 
limited time, how does he want to spend that time, you 
know, with his family”
Treatment preferences Subject BX2: “So, I’m trying to flush out exactly what the 
discussions had been between the two of them about what 
the preferences would be since he’s, you know, I decided 
in this instance that having a discussion with him was 
going to be too difficult and that he’d probably be too 
hypercarbic and just too short of breath to carry on a 
meaningful conversation about something this 
complicated, and so I focused on his immediate surrogate 
and to see what kind of conversations they had had.”
Asking about support Subject BX6: “In my experience, I find that the family is 
very grateful when I start getting the priest and social 
services involved.”
Eliciting questions Interviewer: “Now you asked her if she had any 
questions?”
Subject A14: “Yes…Well, you know, we use a lot of 
jargon and so if there are questions about what we think 
might be wrong or what are the things that we’re going to 
do. People sometimes have questions about whether we 
think they’re going to live.”
Patient history (10) From chart Subject BCX5: “The chart did tip me that the CAT scan 
was indicative of lymphangitic spread of the tumor in 
multiple areas of the lung.”
From questioning Subject A21: And the reason I asked him if he has been in 
the ICU before and been intubated is patients who have 
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Concept Category Concept Category Item Example text or explanation
been through that experience they are more likely to be 
willing to do it again and if that experience was a very 
negative one and they have made a very clear decision 
against it, they make it very clear to me right then and 
there as well.”
Patient understanding (11) See reality Subject BX5: “My overall sense was that they did not 
have as good a handle on what was going on with him, his 
underlying problems, as I would hope.”
Competent Subject C14: “I was just assessing his mental status and 
whether, again, just further gathering evidence that what 
his clinical status was. Was he hypoxic to the point of 
being altered, he was not but it does not really change the 
fact that his vital signs were terrible and it makes it so that 
I can feel like I can talk to him and have a reasonable 
conversation, you know, like he knows, you know, is 
capable of understanding what I am talking about.”
Surrogate (12) Trustworthy Subject BX6: “I don’t put as much store in a sister as a 
wife, I am not really sure why, as I have been married for 
28 years, but usually because siblings can often be 
detached from their sibling, but where as though there can 
be secondary gain or loss, basically a spouse tend to have 
a much more understanding this early of their spouse.”
Knows patient preferences Subject C04: “… you have either the patient and the 
family have not thought about it or even though they have 
thought about it, they have not talked about it. They 
[actors in scenario] had been so clear about their wishes 
and been so on the same page.”
See reality Subject B11: “Well, again I do not know. If he has had 
cancer for 5 years, it would be different than if he just had 
it for 3 weeks because their level of understanding and 
acceptance are different between the two cases”
†
The adjacent number corresponds to the identification number in Figure 1.
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Appendix Figure 1. 
Chronologic use of mental model concepts during simulation debriefing interview: an 
illustrative sample of physicians who intubated and did not intubate the simulated patient. 
Each concept mentioned during the debriefing interview is noted by a box with a number 
corresponding to a concept number in Figure 1, in the order which is was mentioned during 
the debriefing interview. The colors represent post analysis grouping of ideas and processes. 
A color key is provided in the corresponding table.
Appendix Figure 2. 
Example calculation for the concept category “Patient Preferences” for Subject A14. Raw 
data is listed on the left for the coded interview for Subject A14. The box and line figure 
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demonstrates the category concept of interest in the calculation (“Patient Preferences”) and 
the associated category concepts connected by ideological relationships or links. The weight 
of the outlines or links represents the raw frequencies coded during this interview. Heavier 
outlines or links were mentioned more frequently.
A visual inspection of the raw data shows this physician used most of the expert model 
concept categories (11 out of 12), but their use of concept linking was focused (only using 5 
out of 17 possible) on the concept category “Patient Preferences” (4 of the 5 mentioned 
links). Calculation of the relative frequencies of the links tempers the repeated mentions of 
links to physician goal and surrogate. The category score for “Patient preferences” is a 
summation of the five relative frequencies of the associated links to “Physician 
Questioning”, “Physician Explanation”, “Patient Understanding”, “Physician Goals”, and 
“Surrogate”.
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Expert mental model of key concepts described by physicians encountering a terminally and 
critically ill elder. Concepts or ideas were identified and grouped by an expert panel into 
concept categories with a descriptive heading. For example the concept category “Patient 
Understanding” has two related sub-concepts termed “see reality” and “competent”. The 
grouping is represented in this figure by the encompassing box. In this figure, lines 
connecting the concept category boxes represent ideological links or relationships between 
the concept categories (e.g., instances in which concepts were mentioned in the same 
statement during the interview.) In this expert model, not all concept categories were thought 
to have ideological links and are not connected by a line in this figure.
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Summary mental model representing the thought process of physicians who intubated versus 
those who did not intubate a simulated patient. These models represent the unweighted 
average frequency of concepts mentioned by physicians who (a) intubated or (b) did not 
intubate the terminally ill simulation patient. The thickness of each outline or line 
corresponds to the frequency that the concept or link between concepts was mentioned 
during the interview. Heavily weighted lines represent concepts which were frequently 
mentioned. This does not account for repetition or talkativeness.
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Table 1
Physician characteristics (n=73)
Characteristic category Characteristic Measure
Demographics Male Gender, n (%) 54 (74)
Age, mean (range) 40 (29 – 70)
Years since graduation from medical school, mean (range) 12.8 (3 – 42)
Primary role in the hospital
 Intensivist, n (%) 29 (40)
 Emergency, n (%) 20 (33)
 Hospitalist, n (%) 24 (32)
Home institution
 Institution A, n (%) 20 (27%)
 Institution B, n (%) 32 (44%)
 Institution C, n (%) 21 (29%)
Attitudes towards uncertainty Anxiety from diagnostic uncertainty score*, mean (range) 19 (8–29)
Concern about bad outcomes score*, mean (range) 12 (3–18)
Reluctance to disclose uncertainty to patients score*, mean (range) 23 (14–29)
Reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians score*, mean (range) 10 (6–12)
Risk tolerance - willingness to gamble when risk framed as gain†, n (%) 2/70 (3)    
Risk aversion – willingness to gamble when risk framed as loss†, n (%) 24/70 (34)    
*
Data available for 71 of 73 study physicians. Subscales of Gerrity et al physician reactions to uncertainty subscales. Higher scores indicate greater 
anxiety, concern about bad outcomes, relutance to disculos uncertainty to ptients, and reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians, respectively. 
The maximum ranges that can be measured by the scales are 5 to 30 for the anxiety and disclosing uncertainty to patients scales, 3 to 18 for the bad 
outcomes scale, and 2 to 12 for the disclosing mistakes to physicians scale.
†
Data available for 70 of 73 study physicians. Physicians are asked to choose, for a hypothetical patient with hypertension, between therapies 
which offer (a) a certain gain of five years’ life expectancy, or (b) a 50/50 gamble of gaining ten or zero year’s life expectancy (certain gain frame). 
Then physicians are asked to choose, for a hypothetical patient with cancer, between therapies which offer (a) a certain loss of five years’ life 
expectancy, or (b) a 50/50 gamble of losing ten or zero year’s life expectancy (certain loss frame).
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Table 2
Univariable relationship between physician characteristics and the decision to intubate
Characteristic category Characteristic Test statistic, df P-value Effect size
Demographics Gender* χ2 = 0.026, df = 1 >0.99 0.021
Age† z = −0.854 0.39 −0.102
Years since graduation from medical school† z = −1.126 0.26 −0.132
Primary role in the hospital* χ2 = 4.508, df = 1 0.09 0.251
Home institution* χ2 = 2.395, df = 1 0.39 0.181
Attitudes towards uncertainty Anxiety from diagnostic uncertainty§ t = −1.498, df = 69 0.14 0.603
Concern about bad outcomes† z = −1.562 0.12 0.192
Reluctance to disclose uncertainty to patients§ t = −2.152, df = 69 0.03 1.033
Reluctance to disclose mistakes to physicians† z = − 1.943 0.05 0.232
Risk tolerance – willingness to gamble when risk framed as 
gain*
χ2 = 4.509, df = 1 0.17 0.251
Risk aversion – willingness to gamble when risk framed as 
loss*
χ2 = 3.054, df = 1 0.17 0.211
df – degrees of freedom
*











Cohen’s d = (M1 – M2)/SDpool

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Med Decis Making. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2019 April 01.
